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1035, 19 A.L.R. 1119] ; Endicott v. Rosenthal, 216 Cal. 721, 
725-727 [16 P.2d 673] ; Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. 
2d 446, 464 [55 P.2d 177]; Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 16720, d, 
e (1), (2), (3); 16902.) [7b] Thus the injunction cannot 
reasonably be interpreted as prohibiting defendants from con-
tracting with their customers to provide services at such prices 
as the customers may agree to pay. It only enjoins defendants 
from agreeing among themselves to engage in the prohibited 
activities. 
Since the stipulated facts support the judgment as entered 
and there is no evidence that would support a contrary con-
clusion, the order granting a new trial is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, 
J., concurred. 
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment. 
[S. F. No. 18539. In Bank. Dec. 1.'5, 1953.] 
WILLIAM BERGER, Appellant, v. MAURICE O'HEARN, 
as Administrator, etc., Respondent. 
[1] Limitation of Actions-Suspension of Statute-Death.-Gen-
erally, in absence of specific statute to contrary, intervening 
death of obligor does not toll a general statute of limitations 
on an accrued cause of action. 
[2] Decedents' Estates-Statutes of Limitations-Actions Against 
Estate.-Code Civ. Proc., § 353, declaring that if person against 
whom an action may be brought dies before time limited for 
its commencement an action may be filed within one year after 
issuing of letters testamentary or of administration, in effect 
gives claimant a period of grace of one year from issuance of 
[1] Application and limits of rule that death of person liable 
does not interrupt running of statute of limitations, note, 174 
A.L.R. 1423. See, also, Oal.Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 158; 
Am.Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 212. 
[2] See Oal.Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 942 et seq.; 
Am.Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 924 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Limitation of Actions, § 108; [2, 3] 
Decedents' Estates, § 834; [4, 6, 7] Decedents' Estates, § 549; [ 5] 
Decedents' Estates, § 504. 
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letters in any case in which general statute of limitations 
would have expired before end of such period. 
[3] !d.-Statutes of Limitations-Actions Against Estate.-Code 
Civ. Proc., § 353, does not aid claimant where time fixed by 
general statute of limitations did not expire until more than 
one year after obligor's death; it is applicable only when 
necessary to extend general statute of limitations and cannot 
be used to curtail it. 
[4] !d.-Claims-Period for Suit After Rejection.-Code Civ. 
Proc., § 353, is sole provision affecting period of limitation 
on a cause of action in event of disability resulting from death 
of person liable, and Frob. Code, § 714, declaring that where 
a claim is rejected by legal representative of decedents' estate 
the claimant must bring his action within three months after 
receipt of written notice of rejection, and similar provisions 
of Probate Code, are concerned strictly with matters of pro-
bate procedure and may shorten but cannot lengthen general 
statute of limitations. 
[5] Id.- Claims- Presentation Before Notice to Creditors.-A 
claim against decedent's estate may be filed at any time after 
letters of administration are issued, regardless of whether 
notice to creditors has been published. 
[6] !d.-Claims-Period for Suit After Rejection.-Although dur-
ing 10-day period before action against decedent's estate on a 
claim could be commenced (Frob. Code, § 712) the general 
statute of limitations would have been suspended, such action 
was barred by limitation where claimant's complaint was filed 
more than one year and a half after statute had run. 
[7] !d.-Claims-Period for Suit After Rejection.-Mere filing 
of claim against decedent's estate with probate court does not 
amount to commencement of action on claim within meaning 
of statute of limitations in view of express statement in Code 
Civ. Proc., § 350, that an action is commenced when complaint 
is filed. (Declaring that contrary dictum in Beckett v. Selover, 
7 Cal. 215, 241, decided prior to enactment of § 350, is no 
longer correct.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Mateo County. Murray Draper, Judge. .Affirmed . 
.Action against administrator on claim for alleged indebted-
ness of decedent. Judgment for defendant on sustaining 
demurrer to complaint without leave to amend, affirmed. 
William Berger, in pro. per., W. L . .A. Calder and .Abraham 
Glicksberg for .Appellant. 
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Samuel L. Fen del, Sol Silverman, James A. Toner and 
William W. Coshow, for Respondent. 
EDMONDS, J.-William Berger, assertedly a creditor of 
the estate of V. B. McMahan, brought this action after his 
claim had been rejected. The administrator's demurrer to 
the complaint was sustained without leave to amend. The 
question presented for decision upon Berger's appeal from 
the judgment thereafter entered concerns the applicability 
of a general statute of limitations. 
According to Berger's complaint, in 1945 McMahan be-
came indebted to him upon an account stated and suit was 
commenced to recover the amount of the debt. That action 
since has been dismissed for lack of prosecution. McMahan 
died in 1947, and letters of administration were issued to 
Maurice 0 'Hearn. In February, 1948, within the prescribed 
statutory time, Berger presented a claim against the estate, 
based upon the pending suit. No further action in regard 
to the claim was taken by either party until more than 
three years later. Berger was then given formal written 
notice that it had been rejected and shortly afterward he 
filed the present action. 
In support of the demurrer, the administrator asserts that 
the complaint, on its face, shows the bar of the statute of 
limitations. 
The period of limitation applicable to the claimed indebted-
ness is four years, commencing at the time the account was 
stated. (Code Civ. Proc., § 337 [2].) Unaffected by the in-
tervening death of McMahan, the :final date upon which 
Berger could commence an action upon the debt would have 
been November 13, 1949. 
[1] As a general rule, in the absence of a specific statute 
to the contrary, the intervening death of an obligor does not 
toll a general statute of limitations upon an accrued cause 
of action. (See Tynan v. Walker, 35 Cal. 634, 638 [95 Am. 
Dec. 152]; Wood, Limitations [4th ed.] § 6; 34 Am.Jur., 
Limitation of Actions, § 212, p. 170.) It has been recognized, 
however, that such a rule often may result in hardship to 
creditors whose right of action might expire between the 
debtor's death and the commencement of administration of 
the estate. Accordingly, in many states statutes have been 
enacted which extend the limitation period so as to give the 
creditor an opportunity to bring an action against the per-
sonal representative. (See note, 174 A.L.R. 1423.) 
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[2] Section 353 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: 
''If a person against whom an action may be brought dies 
before the expiration of the time limited for the commence-
ment thereof, and the cause of action survive, an action may 
be commenced against his representatives, after the expira-
tion of that time, and within one year after the issuing of 
letters testamentary or of administration.'' In effect, this 
section gives a claimant a period of grace of one year from 
the issuance of letters in any case in which the general statute 
of limitations would have expired before the end of such 
period. 
[3] The administrator correctly contends, however, that 
section 353 does not aid Berger because the time fixed by 
the general statute of limitation did not expire until more 
than one year after the death of McMahan. The provision is 
applicable only when necessary to extend the general statute 
of limitations and cannot be used to curtail it. (Lowell v. 
Kier, 50 Cal. 646, 648; Harris v. Mount Washington Co., 
55 Cal.App. 144, 146 [202 P. 903] .) 
[4] Berger takes the position that section 714 of the Pro-
bate Code also may operate to extend the general statute 
of limitations. Uniformly, however, the decisions of this 
state have held that section 353 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure is the sole provision affecting the period of limita-
tion upon a cause of action in the event of a disability 
resulting from the death of the person liable. Section 714 
and similar provisions of the Probate Code are concerned 
strictly with matters of probate procedure. (Bank of 
America v. Thomas, 7 Cal.2d 154, 156 [59 P.2d 990]; Bar-
clay v. Blackinton, 127 Cal. 189, 193-194 [59 P. 834]; Mc-
Millan v. Hayward, 94 Cal. 357, 361 [29 P. 774]; Dodson v. 
Greuner, 28 Cal.App.2d 418, 421-422 [82 P.2d 741] ; see 
Scott Stamp & Coin Co. v. Leake, 9 Cal.App. 511, 515 [99 
P. 731] .) 
In Barclay v. Blackinton, supra, the decision was based 
upon facts identical in all material respects with those shown 
by the present record. It was contended that section 714 
of the Probate Code (formerly Code Civ. Proc., § 1498) in-
creased the time for suing upon a claim to three months after 
its rejection. After a review of the authorities in other juris-
dictions, the court pointed to the prevailing rule that general 
statutes of limitation, and special or "nonclaim" statutes 
similar to section 1498, serve different functions and operate 
independently of each other. (Citing 2 Woerner's American 
Law of Administration, § 400; see also ibid. [3d ed.] § 400, 
Dec.1953] BERGER v. O'HEARN 
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p. 1320.) A nonclaim statute "may shorten but cannot be 
held to lengthen the general statute of limitations." (P. 193; 
accord Gray Realty Co. v. Robinson, 111 Utah 521 [184 P.2d 
237]; Malone v. Averill, 166 Iowa 78 [147 N.W. 135].) 
Relying upon Estate of Caravas, 40 Cal.2d 33 [250 P.2d 
593], Berger argues that the statute of limitations was tolled 
during the period in which the claim was not acted upon by 
the administrator. Apparently his argument is based upon 
section 356 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides: 
"When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunc-
tion or statutory prohibition, the time of the continuance of 
the injunction or prohibition is not part of the time limited 
for the commencement of the action." 
In the Caravas case, a nonresident alien, as heir of her 
son's estate, petitioned to recover certain property which had 
been distributed to the state treasurer pursuant to section 
1027 of the Probate Code. The trial court denied the peti-
tion on the ground that the action was filed more than five 
years after the distribution of the estate and thus was barred 
by section 1026 of the Probate Code. 
This court reversed the judgment. It was held that during 
a substantial part of the five-year period the country of the 
petitioner's resident was occupied by an enemy of the United 
States and, by the Trading With the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C.A. 
Appendix § 2), she was disabled from instituting a proceed-
ing to enforce her rights in the estate. Accordingly under 
sections 354 and 356 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the 
period of disablement was excluded from the time fixed by 
the limitation provision of section 1026. 
No such disablement appears in the present case. Berger 
had more than one year after letters of administration were 
issued to 0 'Hearn in which to enforce his claim. [5] He 
could have presented his claim at any time after letters 
were issued, regardless of whether notice to creditors had 
been published (Janin v. Bro·wne, 59 Cal. 37, 43), and brought 
his action after 10 days from the date his claim was pre-
sented. (Prob. Code, § 712; San Francisco Bank v. St. 
Clair, 47 Cal.App.2d 194, 199-200 (117 P.2d 703]; Ratterree 
Land Co. v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 26 Cal.App.2d 652, 
657 [80 P.2d 102] .) [6] Although during the 10-day period 
before an action could be commenced the general statute of 
limitations would have been suspended (Nally v. McDonald, 
66 Cal. 530, 532 [6 P. 390]), Berger's complaint was filed 
more than one year and a half after the statute had run. 
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[7] Berger's final contention is that the filing of a claim 
with the probate court itself amounted to the commencement 
of an action within the meaning of the statute of limitations. 
However, section 350 of the Code of Civil Procedure ex-
pressly states that "[a]n action is commenced, within the 
meaning of this title, when the complaint is filed.'' Beckett 
v. Selover, 7 Cal. 215, 241 [68 Am.Dec. 237], was decided 
prior to the enactment of section 350, and the contrary dictum 
in that decision no longer is correct. (See Maurer v. Kirng, 
127 Cal. 114, 117 [59 P. 290]; Barclay v. Blackinton, supra, 
p. 194; Estate of Garnet, 126 Cal.App. 344, 346 [14 P.2d 
572] .) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I disagree with the construction placed, by the majority, 
upon the statutes in question. In the main, that construction 
is based upon the old case of Barclay v. Blackinton, 127 Cal. 
189 [59 P. 834], which was decided in 1899 before the amend-
ment to section 1498 (now Prob. Code, § 714) of the Code 
of Civil Procedure. 
The chrono1ogy of the factual situation as disclosed by the 
record is as follows : 
The obligation here involved was incurred shortly prior 
to December 6, 1945. 
The defendant died in July, 1947. 
Letters of administration were issued on his estate in 
August, 1947. 
Plaintiff's creditor's claim was filed February 3, 1948, with-
in the statutory time. 
Written notice of the rejection of the claim was given to 
plaintiff on February 20, 1951. 
Present action commenced by plaintiff on claim on April 
18, 1951. 
General four-year statute limitation expired in November, 
1949. 
Section 353 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that 
an action may be commenced against the legal representative 
of a deceased person within one year after the issuance of 
letters testamentary or of administration. Section 712 of 
the Probate Code provides that if the executor or administrator 
Dec. 1953] BERGER v. 0 'HEARN 
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neglects or refuses to allow or reject a claim for ten days after 
its filing, it may be deemed rejected on the tenth day. Section 
714 of the Probate Code provides that within three months 
after written notice of rejection of a claim, suit must be 
brought thereon. 
As above seen, a claim was duly filed in the instant case on 
lilebruary 3, 1948; formal notice of rejection of the claim was 
given to plaintiff on February 20, 1951, some three years after 
the claim was filed. After receipt of the formal notice of rejec-
tion of his claim, plaintiff promptly began his action; the gen-
eral statute of limitations ran on the obligation in November, 
1949. Section 712 of the Probate Code provides that the claim-
ant may at his "option" deem the claim rejected on the tenth 
day; the section is not mandatory, but permissive. Section 
714 of the Probate Code provides that suit must be brought 
on a claim within three months after formal written notice 
of rejection. Sections 710 and 711 (claims filed with clerk 
and claims presented to executor or administrator) provide 
that the executor or administrator rnust allow or reject the 
claims. The executor or administrator rnust either allow or 
reject the claim, but if he does not do so the claimant, at his 
own option, may await his action which, if it be to reject the 
claim, then gives the claimant three additional months in 
which to bring an action. To so construe the sections makes 
them harmonious. To construe them, as is done in the majority 
opinion, has the effect of rendering nugatory the optional 
provision in section 712, the mandatory provisions of sections 
710 and 711 and the three months' provision in section 714. 
For example, a claim is filed within the time allowed and is 
not acted upon by the administrator or executor. If the claim-
ant, at his option, decides not to deem the claim rejected but 
desires to await the action of the executor or administrator, 
relying upon the three months' provision in section 714, he 
will, if the general statute has run in the interim, find himself 
without a remedy. Since the sections ( 710 and 711) provide 
that action rnust be taken by the administrator or executor, 
section 712, which gives the claimant an option to deem it 
rejected in 10 days, can have no purpose but to permit (not 
to compel), if desired, action for recovery on the claim prior 
to action by the representative of the deceased rejecting 
the claim. 
Barclay v. Blackinton, sttpra, 127 Cal. 189, 193, which is 
factually similar to the case under consideration, had this to 
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say: ''It is said that under the Code of Civil Procedure, sec-
tion 1498 [now Probate Code, § 714], the plaintiff had three 
months after the claim was formally and officially rejected 
by the administrator in which to bring his action. We do not 
so construe the statute. The section may shorten but cannot 
be held to lengthen the general statute of limitations. The 
special limitation of time within which suit must be brought 
against the estates of deceased persons are called in many 
states statutes of nonclaim or of short or special limitation. 
These limitations exist independent of and collateral to the 
general law of limitations. (2 Woerner's American Law of 
Administration, sec. 400, and cases cited.) '' Ten years after 
the decision in the Barclay case was handed down, section 
1498 (now Prob. Code, § 714) was amended so as to provide 
that written notice of the rejection of a claim "shall be given 
by the executor or administrator to the holder of such claim.'' 
Prior to that amendment, no written notice of rejection had 
been provided for before the three months' period for suit on 
the claim commenced to run. In Estate of Wilcox, 68 Cal. 
App.2d 780, at page 785 [158 P.2d 32], it was specifically 
held that the first part of section 714 of the Probate Code 
was a statute of limitations. In Fifield v. Bullwinkel, 81 
Cal.App. 440, at page 442 [253 P. 962], it was held that 
'' ... it follows that without regard to the time of publication 
of notice to creditors, the period of three months as limited 
by section 1498 [Prob. Code, § 714] of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, within which the claimant must bring his action upon 
a rejected claim, begins to run on the date when the executor 
first gives to the claimant written notice of such rejection." 
(Emphasis added.) 
This section (Prob. Code, § 714) deals expressly and speci-
fically with the bringing of an action upon a rejected claim in 
probate. The remedy there afforded is conditioned only upon 
the claimant commencing his action within three months after 
receipt of notice of rejection from the executor or adminis-
trator. There is no requirement that the action must be 
brought within one year after the issuance of letters testa-
mentary or of administration. To hold, as is held by the 
majority, that the action must be brought within a year from 
the issuance of letters, or within the period of the general 
statute of limitation, is to render nugatory not only the three 
months' period provided for by section 714 but the mandatory 
provisions of section 712 of the Probate Code relating to 
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notice of allowance or rejection of claims by the executor or 
administrator. 
The rule is well established that all of the statutory provi-
sions in all of the codes must be read together and harmonized 
if possible. As stated by this court in In re Porterfield, 28 
Cal.2d 91, at page 100 [168 P.2d 706, 167 A.L.R. 675] : "It 
is a well-recognized rule that for purposes of statutory con-
struction the codes are to be regarded as blending into each 
other and constituting but a single statute. [Citing cases.]" 
It would seem that under this rule the provisions of the Code 
of Civil Procedure relating to the time within which actions 
must be commenced should be so construed as to give effect 
to the above cited provisions of the Probate Code relating to 
the approval and rejection of claims against estates of deceased 
persons and the commencement of an action for recovery of 
a rejected claim. The majority opinion gives no consideration 
to the above-mentioned rule. 
In my opinion, the rule of the Barclay case which was laid 
down in 1899, should be restated in the light of the present 
statutes as well as in the light of present day conditions. It is 
placing too great a burden on attorneys today to hold that 
they must deem a claim rejected and commence an action 
thereon at the close of the 10-day period provided for in 
section 712 of the Probate Code or run the risk of their 
elient 's claim being barred by a general statute of limitation; 
it is also not in harmony with the provisions of that section 
and those of section 714 of the same Code. 
Under the interpretation placed on the above-mentioned 
statutes by the majority opinion it would be possible for the 
general statute of limitation to run either before a claimant 
had an opportunity to present his claim against the estate 
of a deceased debtor or before he could bring suit on the claim 
after presentation of it, but that situation does not exist in 
this case. However, the statute should be construed so as 
to afford a remedy to a claimant under any factual situation 
which might arise. 
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January 11, 
1954. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
41 C.2d-24 
